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of civil society, the reform process in the EU’s 
Eastern neighborhood is unlikely to bring fruit, 
and there are many reasons to believe that the 
situation is not different in the Mediterranean.2 
Although the Union is not expected to be the 
driver of the Arab reform, it can and should be 
an important supporter. In order to strengthen 
its capacity to deliver in the reform process, 
the EU will most probably initiate talks with 
new governments of the Arab countries on 
upgrading the existing Association Agreements. 
Although the Union has already announced 
some principles of the new approach to the 
region, the concrete shape of the new policy 
has to be agreed jointly with representatives of 
the region.
2	We	are	aware	of	the	potential	vagueness	of	the	term	“civil	
society”	and	“non-state	actors.”	As	both	terms	are	contested	
and	subject	to	different	interpretations,	in	this	paper	we	do	
not	elaborate	on	the	terminological	debate,	but	we	are	
using	an	operational	definition	based	on	the	lowest	common	
denominator:	groups	of	engaged	citizens	(institutionalized	or	
not,	registered	or	not)	proposing	and	advocating	for	ideas	for	
social	change.
INTRODUCTION1
This paper proposes modalities for stronger and 
more efficient EU engagement in the reform 
of Arab countries that recently underwent 
revolutions, without necessarily putting extra 
burden on financial expenditure allocated for 
the region. It argues that the EU policy in the 
Mediterranean  has to be grounded in structured 
partnership with non-state actors, which engages 
them in all phases of policy cycle including 
planning of goals and monitoring of results of EU-
MED cooperation. The paper draws on lessons 
from the EU’s Eastern policy and identifies the 
Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP 
CSF) as a potential inspiration for the Union’s 
efforts in the Mediterranean. The existence 
and trends within the EaP CSF are  important 
evidence of the fact that without engagement 
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2
proposals for social change will have to be 
translated into a broader national consensus on 
reform priorities and methods. Such a consensus 
is a prerequisite for major reforms to take root 
and last. 
The two obvious candidates for most immediate 
progress are Tunisia and Egypt. Tunisia already 
held its first post-revolutionary free elections on 
October 23, 2011, and the winning Ennahdha 
party announced ambition to form a government 
within a month. Egyptian parliamentary elections 
are scheduled for November 28, 2011. Egypt, 
however, might be under military tutelage until 
at least 2013, the earliest scheduled date for 
presidential elections. The appointment of new 
governments that will have come out of free and 
fair elections will be an important step in the 
reform process and, at the same time, it gives 
these two countries a head-start in comparison 
to Libya, where parliamentary elections might 
happen as late as 2013, or  Syria, where state 
violence continues or Morocco and Algeria, 
where only moderate state-driven reforms have 
been announced. 
The elections certainly are an important 
requirement for legitimacy of the reform process, 
yet, the new parliaments and governments will 
not be the only social forces with aspirations 
for proposing new policies. The Spring 
2011 protests were not coordinated by any 
single ‘committee’ but were rather a result 
of spontaneous efforts of many formal and 
informal groups. Although the Tunisian and 
Egyptian  regimes were brought down by revolt 
of hundreds of thousands of people, not all 
of them will be in the forefront of the country’s 
reform. While many will continue expressing 
opinions on  the government policy, only few 
will propose concrete ideas for social change 
and methods of achieving it. These will not only 
protest, but they will be willing to co-shape the 
policy cycle. 
Yet, presently, civil society is fragmented, 
overwhelmed by the scale of reconstruction to 
be done and eager to hear about other reform 
projects carried out elsewhere. Important 
inspiration comes from Central and Eastern 
Dialogue with civil society has to be an 
important source of stimuli and ideas for 
the revamped Euro-Med partnership. At the 
moment, the Union lacks concrete tools for 
systematic engagement of the region’s civil 
society into shaping new relations with the 
EU on one hand, and new consensus within 
the respective Mediterranean countries on the 
other. For years, one of the major concerns of 
Egyptian or Tunisian civil societies about the EU 
has been that the Union chose to talk to and 
support mainly the illegitimate state authorities 
and (GO)NGOs3  and it  downplayed the 
voice of anti-regime forces. 
We argue that a portion of the 288 million 
EUR pledged for the Southern neighborhood for 
the period 2011-2013 (and additional 1242 
million pledged for the whole neighborhood 
until 2013 in the Commission’s May 2011 
Review of the European Neighborhood policy), 
should be used to support systematic and 
institutionalized engagement with civil society. 
Pooling the scarce resources it has into activities 
that will contribute to multi-stakeholder dialogue 
will help it respond to the needs voiced by the 
region and to restore the EU’s credibility.
NEEDs Of ThE REgION aND 
ExpECTaTIONs fROM EUROpE 
Southern Mediterranean countries will be 
undergoing several key reforms in the upcoming 
years. The Arab Spring has mobilized masses 
who showed courage and risked lives by 
expressing disapproval with the authoritarian 
regimes. Yet, while calls for dignity and 
socioeconomic justice seem to be the key 
demands of the MENA citizens, there are plenty 
of ideas  how to achieve them. While after 
years of suppression of freedom of expression 
and association, the boom in the number of 
political parties and informal civic groups is an 
understandable development, the competing 
3	 GONGO	is	an	acronym	used	for	government-organized/
initiated	NGOs,	i.e.	organizations	that	pretend	to	be	
independent	of	state	but	in	practice	they	act	as	its	extended	
hand.
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RECOMMENDaTIONs
Based on the analysis presented here, we recommend 
the following concrete steps to be undertaken by EU 
policymakers in order to deliver on commitments 
made to North Africa and the Middle East.
Key	recommendation:
• The EU Council should ask the European 
Commission to reflect on the successes and 
shortcomings of the EaP CSF and to provide an 
expert opinion on the feasibility of launching a 
pilot version of the Southern Mediterranean Civil 
Society Forum. Such a forum would have positive 
impact on creating national consensus on reform 
priorities in respective South-Med countries, and 
would strengthen the flow of information between the 
EU, partner states and civil society. More importantly, 
it would contribute to a more constructive dialogue 
between states and civil society in Arab countries, 
something that people who brought down the old 
regimes deeply long for. 
Activities	that	might	support	implementation	of	the	key	
recommendation:
• The EU grant agency Europeaid should, after 
consultation with respective EEAS and Commission 
and Council DG’s, adjust the priorities of the calls 
under existing instruments (chiefly ENPI, EIDHR, 
LA&NSA schemes) to create more opportunities for 
South-East peer learning. Although the Eastern and 
Southern neighborhood of the EU are addressed by 
a single policy, this policy shares merely a common 
website (even that is, with the exception of general 
information, divided into Euro-Med and Euro-East). 
The representatives of Southern civil society should 
have opportunity to attend and observe meetings 
of EaP national platforms in the six Eastern partner 
countries and/or National convention proceedings 
in Moldova and Ukraine.
The opportunity to observe these dialogues and to 
ask questions might be a source of inspiration for 
MENA reformers on how to structure institutions with 
similar goals in their respective countries. Importantly, 
opening the doors to the Eastern experience might 
have a positive impact on the EU’s image problem, as 
it would clearly show that not all its policies towards 
the neighborhood have been motivated by self-interest 
and to the detriment of the neighborhood. Moreover, 
creating funding opportunities for exchanges with 
Turkey, a country whose reform experience certainly 
might be an inspiration for reformers in Arab countries, 
would also be a step towards fulfilling the EU’s goals 
in the neighborhood and responding to the demands 
of South-Med civil society. Again, no additional 
funds would be necessary, merely a readjustment of 
priorities of existing calls or calls under preparation. 
Presently, Turkey and the Middle East and North 
Africa are rarely if ever listed as eligible countries in 
EU funding calls supporting civil society networking 
with EU policymakers. 
• Several new EU member states (e.g., Slovakia and 
Estonia) have programs for sharing the lessons of their 
own transitions. These do not target only civil society, 
but state servants. It is essential that the state elites are 
also a target of EU assistance, since it is the dialogue 
of state and civil society that should lead to reforms 
and change. Thus, the EU and member states’ 
instruments for support of reforms in the Southern 
neighborhood should promote engagement of both 
representatives of state institutions and civil society 
in joint activities. The goal of this should be stronger 
awareness among South-Med political elites that civil 
society is not an enemy but can be a useful co-worker 
and partner. 
• The EU’s new instruments, such as the Civil 
Society Facility and the European Endowment 
for Democracy should be, in the Southern 
Mediterranean, used to fund the proposed 
systematic and institutionalized dialogue between 
state and civil society in the respective countries, and 
for dialogue with the European Union. Although ad 
hoc workshops and exchanges have their merit, now 
that experience shows that systematic dialogue is 
more efficient, it should receive adequate funding. 
• Although the Union has carried out and will carry 
out a number of useful initiatives that benefit the region, 
civil society in the Southern Mediterranean has little 
awareness of the policy cycle in the post-Lisbon EU, 
and of the instruments that can be used to support 
its work. EU financial instruments should prioritise 
and support awareness raising and education on 
the EU policy process. The EU should empower non-
state actors to become equal partners in discussing 
the policy process. With a greater awareness of the 
nuances of EU decision-making, accompanied 
by access for non-state actors to EU policy-makers, 
a truly deep engagement with civil society becomes 
possible.
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Europe and Turkey4, where reforms leading to 
democratization and liberalization of the public 
sphere have occurred. Above all though, civil 
society does not want to be sidelined during 
the reform process but requests presence in 
the center of reforms to come. The civil society 
networks, some of which are transforming 
themselves into policy research units, have 
proven crucial in mobilization for regime 
change and will continue to be an important 
source of reform ideas. As neither the EU nor 
the Mediterranean states have a track record in 
systematic and institutionalized engagement of 
non-state actors in the respective North African 
countries, it is not an easy task to respond to 
this demand. Yet, it might well be a crucial one. 
The EU in particular should keep eyes and ears 
open to those who are ready to engage with 
it, since European legacy in the region has 
been tainted with hypocrisy and narrow self-
interest.5 Although ‘values’ and ‘rights’ were 
used frequently in the communication of the EU 
and most member states, they have rarely been 
enforced by concrete action. And, what is more 
worrying, even when the European Union and 
its member states had done something positive, 
it often went unnoticed by citizens of Southern 
Mediterranean countries.
4	 South	Africa	or	Malaysia	are	floated	as	well	as	possible	
sources	of	inspirations.		With	regard	to	Turkey,	our	review	
of	EU	funding	opportunities	have	shown	a	striking	lack	of	
EuropeAid	calls	that	would	support	exchange	between	
the	non-state	actors	in	Turkey	and	Middle	East	and	North	
Africa.	Turkey’s	civil	society	is	mostly	eligible	for	funding	
under	Instrument	for	Pre-Accession	Assistance	(IPA),	while	
the	Mediterranean	is	eligible	to	receive	support	from	ENPI.	
Even	when	calls	are	launched	(e.g.,	under	the	Non-State	
Actors	and	Local	Authorities	Programme),	Turkey	and	the	
Mediterranean	rarely	if	ever	find	themselves	in	the	same	
group	of	eligible	countries.	This	makes	practical	exchange	
and	cooperation	impossible	under	EU	funding	tools.
5	 The	negative	legacy	of	Europe	is	not	restricted	to	
colonialism.	The	Suez	crisis	in	1956,	the	overthrow	of	Iranian	
government	in	1953	and	many	other	incidents	including	
the	repeated	failure	to	denounce	several	rigged	elections	
in	the	region	all	testify	to	the	fact,	that	European	states	
emphasized	their	own	national	and	economic	interests	over	
the	interests	of	the	countries	in	the	Southern	Mediterranean.	
A	fitting	illustration	of	European	approach	has	been	infamous	
statement	of	Jacques	Chirac	in	2004,	who	commented	the	
Algerian	elections	with	words:	“I	honestly	and	truly	don’t	see	
what	is	to	be	criticized	about	those	elections.”	(For	more,	
see	Burgat,	F.:	Europe	and	the	Arab	World:	The	Dilemma	of	
Recognising	Counterparts,	International	Politics	(2009)	46,	
616–635.
Despite its mixed legacy, European engagement 
is welcome in the region. The EU and member 
states will be irreplaceable in providing 
resources and know-how for transition projects. 
At the same time, there are many concrete 
expectations from the EU’s policies, ranging 
from access to European market through 
mobility partnership to visa liberalization. 
Above all, the non-state actors expect the EU to 
become an ally in reforming the state institutions 
and improving governance. Importantly, there 
has not been any significant effort exercised by 
the Union to jointly (with actors in the region) 
decide on the nature of the future EURO-MED 
relations. 
Although there is a long list of concrete tasks 
and policy areas where the EU can make 
a difference, the early discussions on its 
involvement should not omit the method of EU 
engagement. We should not only be asking 
what to do, but also how to do it.  What civil 
society expects (and what the states as such can 
only benefit from) is a whole new approach: 
the EU should talk to both states and the non-
state actors. More importantly, the EU should 
encourage domestic dialogue between states 
and representatives of civil society in respective 
Southern Mediterranean countries.
ThE EU’s pasT aND pREsENT 
ENgagEMENT IN ThE REgION
The first concise policy of the EU, the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, was launched in 
1995 with the Barcelona Declaration.6 Despite 
the noble commitments of all signatories to 
human rights, the declaration contained an 
important clause – that the Euro-Med partners 
will “refrain … from any direct or indirect 
intervention in the internal affairs of another 
partner.” Although the partnership has brought 
6	 Barcelona	Declaration	on	Euro-Mediterranean	partnership	
of	1995,	http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/
barcelona_en.htm
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a number of useful initiatives7, it is fair to argue 
that the non-interference clause was perhaps 
the most observed one from the long list of 
commitments the signatories pledged to deliver. 
The EU has comfortably played its role of payer 
(not player) and the dictators were left a free 
hand in suppressing dissent. Under Euro-Med 
partnership, the non-state actors in the region 
received some EU support but this support 
was neither sufficient nor systematic enough to 
enable the pro-democracy forces to facilitate 
social and political change. 
The European Neighborhood Policy launched in 
20048 was supposed to bring stronger and more 
concrete commitment, yet, it has achieved very 
little, largely because the EU’s main interlocutors 
in the region continued to be the representatives 
of the illegitimate states. Moreover, there was 
no independent evaluation of this policy. In 
2008 the Union for the Mediterranean was 
announced9, but although its ambition was 
to focus on concrete and visible projects that 
improve quality of life in Arab countries, it 
came too late and failed to deliver significant 
departure from earlier approaches. In the end, 
there is no evidence that the Arab Spring was 
in any way enabled by the  EU neighborhood 
policy. The low awareness of the positive sides 
of EU engagement so far supports this claim. 
This lesson was not lost on EU policymakers and 
the Spring of 2011 forced the EU to  come up with 
a new policy announced in the March 201110 
7	 Although	in	general	the	Barcelona	process	failed	to	deliver	
its	main	goals,	there	have	been	many	individual	activities	
that	certainly	proved	useful	(e.g.,	youth	exchanges,	research	
cooperation,	minor	infrastructure	support	and	regional	
cooperation	projects).	Given	the	EU’s	emphasis	on	political	
stability	in	the	region,	these	initiatives	however	were	too	
weak	to	contribute	significantly	to	changing	the	system.
8	Wider	Europe	communication	(2003)	and	European	
neighborhood	policy	communication	(2004)
9	 European	Commission	(2008):	Barcelona	Process	-Union	
for	the	Mediterranean.	Communication	to	the	European	
Parliament	and	the	Council,	Brussels,	20/05/08,	
COM(2008)	319
10	 European	Commission	&	EEAS	(2011a).	A	
Partnership	for	Democracy	and	Shared	Prosperity	with	
the	Southern	Mediterranean.	Joint	Communication	to	the	
European	Parliament,	the	Council,	the	ECOSOC	and	
Committee	of	the	Regions.	COM	(2011)	200,	Brussels,	
8.3.2011
and May 201111 joint communications of the 
European Commission and High Representative 
Catherine Ashton. The EU’s new approach has 
received criticism from Arab NGOs, chiefly for 
underestimating the role of non-state actors and 
for a lack of consistency of proposed economic 
policies with the national development needs 
of the countries in question.12 In the May 2011 
review of ENP, the EU announced commitment 
to ‘deep democracy,’ i.e. free and fair elections 
accompanied by real exercises of fundamental 
freedoms and rights. Apart from the existing 
instruments that can be used to achieve this 
goal, two new ones are in preparation: the Civil 
Society Facility and the European Endowment 
for Democracy. 
While both of these instruments do foresee 
support for civil society and informal political 
pro-democratic groups, they are in the end 
not only more of the same but ‘much more 
of the same’ (as we have seen so far), as 
one Commission representative has proudly 
admitted. The new tools do not foresee any 
systematic engagement of civil society in the 
whole policy cycle of domestic reform in the first 
place and Euro-Med relations in the second. 
While it is understandable that the European 
Commission welcomes projects (meetings, 
workshops, trainings of limited number of people 
on limited number of occasions), that  are easy 
to evaluate in the short-term, if these projects 
will not contribute to systematic engagement in 
the policy cycle, the EU is unlikely to achieve 
its objectives in the region. In the end, the May 
2011 ENP review issued by the European 
Commission stipulated “deeper engagement” 
with civil society but so far has not come up 
with sufficient tools for that. 
The EU  instruments are more likely to 
produce an impact if they are used to support 
an  institutionalized dialogue between 
Mediterranean states and civil societies on one 
level, and Mediterranean actors (states + civil 
11	 European	Commission	&	EEAS	(2011b).	A	New	
Response	to	a	Changing	Neighbourhood:	A	Review	of	the	
European	Neighbourhood	Policy.	Joint	Communication	to	
the	European	Parliament,	the	Council,	the	ECOSOC	and	
Committee	of	the	Regions.	COM	(2011)	303,	Brussels,	
25.5.2011
12	 See	e.g.:	ANND	&	EUROSTEP	&	SOCIAL	
WATCH	(2011).	Civil	Society	Reaction	to	the	Joint	
Communication	‘A	Partnership	for	Democracy	and	Shared	
Prosperity’.
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societies) & EU on the other. Should the support 
be restricted only to ad hoc workshops and 
consultations, it is unlikely to deliver the goals of 
truly assisting Mediterranean reform. The EU’s 
success will not necessarily rest on how much it 
will spend in the region, but in what way will it 
spend the money. 
LEaRNINg fROM ThE EU’s EffORTs 
IN ThE EasTERN NEIghbOURhOOD 
Although there are arguably contextual 
differences between the EU’s Eastern and 
Southern neighborhoods, local demands and 
the EU’s objectives are in the end the same: 
better governance in the respective countries 
of the neighborhood. It is often suggested 
that the EU can never be as efficient in the 
South as in the East, since the East has some 
prospects of integration. EU integration of 
the Eastern neighbors is however unlikely 
to happen anytime soon and yet this lack of 
early integration prospects does not prevent the 
Union from supporting better governance.13 At 
the same time, while the problems of Moldova 
and Egypt  might be different in scale, they are 
very similar in principle. Thus, it makes sense to 
get inspiration from the EU’s unfinished efforts 
in the East. 
Presently, the EU’s program for its Eastern 
neighborhood targets six post-Soviet republics: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine. The states of their societies 
and economies are similar to the Southern 
Mediterranean: political and economic power 
has been centralized in hands of a handful 
of elite established in the old authoritarian 
system, corruption and bureaucracy have 
hindered progress, and freedom of speech and 
association have been limited for most of their 
13	 As	of	now,	the	East	European	states	do	not	even	
have	a	‘prospect	of	membership’	(i.e.	the	commitment	from	
the	EU	that	the	Western	Balkans	have).	Given	ongoing	
‘enlargement	fatigue’	and	economic	crisis	in	the	EU,	even	
Western	Balkan	early	membership	seems	hard	to	imagine.
post-Soviet trajectory.14 Although these states 
are still far from fulfilling even moderate criteria 
on good governance, a number of changes 
have taken place in the last decade, driven by 
domestic pro-democracy forces and supported 
by EU funding and know-how. 
With the exception of Azerbaijan and Belarus15, 
the EU’s Eastern partners are becoming 
increasingly pluralistic democracies, in which 
groups of organized citizens, including political 
parties and civil society organizations, articulate 
and pursue their interests. The considerable 
liberalization of public space was assisted by the 
pressure of international organizations including 
the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the 
United Nations, and the International Labour 
Organization. Consequently, the governments 
of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
introduced legislation that improved the position 
of civil society organizations in their respective 
countries. 
In the East, the EU has been adopting a ‘trial and 
error’ approach. The current policy framework 
– the Eastern Partnership (EaP)16  – has 
predecessors in Partnership and Cooperation 
agreements signed shortly after the break-up 
of the Soviet empire, and upgraded with the 
European Neighborhood Policy (2004) and 
the ENP Plus (2007). Although the EU’s present 
approach to the East carries on with many 
mistakes of its predecessors17, there is one 
important difference. 
14	 Popescu,	N.	and	Wilson,	A.	(2009)	The	Limits	of	
Enlargement-Lite:	European	and	Russian	Power	in	the	Troubled	
Neighbourhood.	London:	European	Council	on	Foreign	
Relations.
15	 See	the	ratings	of	Economist	Intelligence	Unit,	
Freedom	House	and	Reporters	without	Borders.
16	 Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	
European	Parliament	and	the	Council:	Eastern	Partnership,	
COM	(2008)	823	final	(Brussels:	European	Commission,	
December	3,	2008;	(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0823:EN:NOT).	;	
Joint	Declaration	of	the	Prague	Eastern	Partnership	Summit.	
Prague,	7	May	2009,	8435/09	(Presse	78)	(Brussels:	
Council	of	the	European	Union,	7	May	2009)	http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
en/er/107589.pdf
17	 i.e.	the	mechanism	of	interaction	between	the	EU	
and	the	government	of	EaP	country	remains	the	same	as	it	
was	under	older	version	of	neighborhood	policy.	In	practice	
this	means	that	there	are	still	no	clear	benchmarks	and	
criteria	for	evaluation	of	progress	and	the	process	of	defining	
priorities	and	evaluation	of	results	is	not	always	open	to	non-
state	actors.
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The policymakers involved with the Eastern 
policy are increasingly becoming aware that 
improvements in governance in respective 
partner countries can be achieved only if the 
civil society is part of the process. Although 
the non-state actors are not yet granted access 
to decision-making systematically, the Eastern 
Partnership came with one important tool to 
achieve this that is likely to gain relevance and 
strength. Before we look closer at the tools for 
civil society engagement, let us briefly recap the 
basic goals and tools of EaP.
The goal of EaP is to improve domestic 
governance in the respective EaP countries. The 
EaP counts on harmonization with the EU acquis 
as a chief instrument for the modernization 
of partner states. In order to implement the 
activities of the Eastern Partnership, the EU 
has supplemented the original ENPI18 budget 
with €350 million of new funds on top of the 
planned resources for 2010-2013. It also re-
programmed €250 million of the ENPI Regional 
Programme East for the same period. 
Although the Eastern Partnership is an initiative 
with good intentions, there is a marked 
discrepancy between ambitious political 
policies and the practical capacities of partners. 
The capacities of the EaP countries to harmonize 
with the sectoral acquis of the EU are limited 
and so is the EU’s ability to provide technical 
assistance and appropriate funding. Although 
it provides for long-term vision of modernization 
and integration with the EU, EaP has nothing 
to contribute to the urgent economic crises the 
Eastern partners are now facing. 
In the bilateral track, the Eastern partners 
were offered to conclude new Association 
Agreements (AA), including integration into 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
(DCFTA). The policy should facilitate the gradual 
integration of the Eastern partners’ economies in 
the EU single market. Yet, the EU’s insistence to 
condition the entry into force of the Association 
Agreement by adoption of the DCFTA appears 
to be counter-productive. 
Ukraine, the first of the Eastern six to conclude 
the sectoral part of its AA  in 2009, took two 
18	 European	Neighborhood	Policy	Instrument	–	a	
funding	tool	for	both	Eastern	and	Southern	dimensions	of	the	
ENP.
more years to negotiate the DCFTA. Had the two 
processes been separated, much of the sectoral 
acquis could have been implemented already. 
Ukraine’s government has been less ready to 
move ahead with sectoral reforms agreed within 
the AA, which is not a contractual deal without 
the DCFTA. Vice versa, the EU leverage on the 
Ukrainian government has been weakened 
when it comes to sectoral reforms since the AA 
cannot come into force without the DCFTA. 
The EU also offered  gradual visa liberalization, 
accompanied by measures to tackle illegal 
immigration and to improve home security 
standards. Mobility and visa dialogue was 
expected to become a “winning area,” 
making the EU closer to populations of partner 
countries. The governments of partner countries 
are requested to meet mostly technical criteria 
that would allow the EU and the Schengen 
countries to liberalize visa regimes for their 
citizens. However, the only achievement of 
two years of visa dialogue are roadmaps for 
visa liberalization with no real benchmarks and 
without impact on everyday life. 
The EaP’s multilateral track addresses four themes: 
1. democracy, good governance and stability; 
2. economic integration and convergence with 
EU policies; 3. energy security; and 4. contacts 
between people. 
The EU as well offered to launch five multilateral 
flagship initiatives: 1. Integrated Border 
Management Programme; 2. SME Facility; 
3. Regional electricity markets and energy 
efficiency; 4. Southern energy corridor; and 5. 
Disaster prevention and preparedness. 
More than two years after EaP’s launch, 
however, the multilateral track offers only 
limited progress. The research19 in Ukraine and 
Moldova showed that officials in the relevant 
ministries and state agencies in the partner 
countries, not to speak of the general public, 
are not informed about agenda, outcomes 
and/or benefits of the flagship initiatives and 
thematic platforms. 
19	 We	draw	on	data	from	the	research	project	
‘Taking	Stock	of	the	Eastern	Partnership’	implemented	by	
RC	SFPA	with	the	support	of	the	Friedrich	Ebert	Foundation	
and	the	International	Visegrad	Fund.		Detailed	results	will	be	
published	in	forthcoming	(2012)	paper.
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NGOs wanted to take part in the Forum’s first 
meeting in 2009, the second has seen more 
than 500 applying.22  
The CSF’s organs include the elected steering 
committee23, four working groups and six 
national platforms. Although the flagship 
event of the EaP CSF is its annual assembly, 
for its goals the far more important organs 
are the thematic working groups (that follow 
developments in EU-partner country relations 
in four thematic platforms of the EaP) and, 
especially, the national platforms. Presently, 
the forum has no stable Secretariat, although 
its preparation is underway, since the steering 
committee within its ad hoc meetings cannot 
manage coordination of the Forum’s activities 
and outputs. 
The institutional structure of the EaP CSF is very 
different from any other initiative the EU has so 
far tried for civil society involvement in any of its 
neighborhoods, including the Mediterranean. 
The strength lies in the fact that the overall goal 
of the CSF is not to serve as one big annual 
gathering, but that its most important work is 
expected to be done on the national level. 
The EaP CSF has had  a positive impact on 
networking and channelling the voice of civil 
societies to their governments and the EU 
institutions. However, there are a number of 
unfinished tasks in the Forum, and they relate 
chiefly to the process of selection of members; 
funding; opportunities for policy impact and 
strength of national platforms. 
22	 Due	to	technical	and	budget	limits	of	the	European	
Commission	only	230	could	take	part	in	the	opening	of	EaP	
CSF,	150	of	which	were	from	the	six	Eastern	countries.	The	
second	meeting	in	Berlin	in	2010	again	convened	230	
NGOs,		153	of	them	from	partner	countries	(Armenia	-	26,	
Azerbaijan	–	23,	Belarus	-	27,	Georgia	-	25,	Moldova	-	23,	
and	Ukraine	–	29),	the	rest	from	the	EU.
23	 The	first	Brussels’	forum	of	2009	elected	the	CSF	
Steering	Committee,	which	consists	of	17	members	of	whom	
8	are	coordinators	of	the	4	working	groups	(established	
in	a	line	with	the	structure	of	the	four	EaP	official	thematic	
platforms),	6	are	national	coordinators	elected	by	the	
national	delegations	of	partner	countries’	CSOs	to	the	CSF,	
and	3	are	representatives	of	CSOs	from	the	EU	member	
states,	including	international	networks.	In	a	sum,	10	of	17	
members	of	the	EaP	CSF	are	representatives	of	CSOs	from	
partner	countries.		The	Steering	Committee	is	elected	at	the	
annual	meeting	of	the	forum	and	rules	the	CSF	activities	till	
the	next	annual	meeting.	There	is	no	permanent	Secretariat	
and/or	any	central	administrative	body	that	would	ensure	
continual	operations	of	the	EaP	CSF	in-between	the	annual	
meetings.	For	more	info	see	EaP’s	web	site:	http://www.
eap-csf.eu/en/about-eap-csf/the-steering-committee/	.
Another tool, the Comprehensive Institution-
Building program (CIB), aimed at strengthening 
administration capacities of the EaP states, 
started to become a reality only in the second 
half of 2011 and it is not ready to be launched 
in all EaP countries. In short, instruments that 
should be an important part of the EaP and 
make it more efficient and visible for both 
governments and citizens of partner countries, 
still do not work. A slow-paced start of new 
instruments undermines the positive dynamics of 
the EaP.
From the perspective of the major instruments, the 
EaP so far does not look successful. It might well 
seem that the biggest chance for success lies in 
something that many at the beginning termed 
a “mandatory ride” to appease civil society: 
the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP 
CSF). Although there are other forums for non-
state actors20,  the EaP CSF has the biggest 
potential to have impact at the national level 
in each of the six partner countries. Although 
not yet fully responding to its potential and 
expectations, the EaP CSF is the only multilateral 
non-governmental forum established within the 
EaP framework that has the potential to become 
a platform for systematic dialogue between civil 
society and policymakers. 
ThE EasTERN paRTNERshIp  
CIvIL sOCIETy fORUM
The establishment of the Civil Society Forum 
(CSF)21, composed of NGOs from the EU 
and partner countries, was met with a great 
enthusiasm. Not surprisingly, civil society has 
long been seeking inclusion in the EU’s debates 
with the governments of partner countries, 
desiring  to take part in defining the priorities 
of EU-East partnerships and monitoring the 
implementation thereof. While more than 400 
20	 Euronest	Parliamentary	Assembly,	an	annual	
Conference	of	Local	and	Regional	Authorities	of	the	EaP,	and	
the	EaP	Business	Forum
21	 “Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	
European	Parliament	and	the	Council:	Eastern	Partnership”,	
COM	(2008)	823	final	(Brussels:	European	Commission,	
December	3,	2008;	(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0823:EN:NOT).
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Although the Eastern CSF is still a work in 
progress, its very existence and the present 
trends of its development are based on years 
of experience with (non)functioning EU policy 
in the East. This experience has shown that 
ad hoc workshops and briefings can never be 
as efficient as systematic and institutionalized 
dialogue with civil society. Let us briefly address 
a few key dilemmas currently faced by the EaP 
CSF that can be inspiring for engagement of the 
Mediterranean civil society.
i) selection process of NgOs
The obvious first question to be asked when one 
proposes a civil society dialogue with countries 
that have thousands of registered NGOs and 
many informal groups (as is the case of  Egypt) 
is: Which organizations will be represented and 
who will choose them? In the EaP CSF, the first 
step towards representation was a declaration 
of interest. These declarations were then 
evaluated by the Forum’s Steering Committee. 
The number of declarations of interest, however, 
by far exceeds the budget of the Forum (still 
relying chiefly on the contribution from the 
European Commission), and  the selection has 
to be done not only for budgetary reasons but 
also for the sake of efficiency. 
Naturally, the selection procedure often leads 
to perceptions of unfair treatment and invites 
questions about the legitimacy of the process. 
The present debate in EaP CSF is split between 
those who argue that the EU should choose 
the partner NGOs and those who believe that 
it is more legitimate if national civil societies 
make their own selections. At the moment it 
is still the Steering Committee making choices 
about who gets represented and who does not. 
We expect that once the national platforms in 
partner countries are more developed, they will 
determine selection and criteria for entry. 
ii) funding
Another important question comes with funding. 
Funding so far largely relies on the European 
Commission, although part of the activities of 
national platforms are co-financed by other 
donors, including the EU  member states. It 
is advisable that the new EU instruments for 
democracy and good governance support 
are used to support NGO engagement in 
this systematic forum. A concern of some EU-
based NGO’s has been that the European 
Commission covers participation costs 
exclusively to representatives of CSOs from 
partner countries, not from the EU member 
states, with the exception of members of the 
Steering Committee, which leads to a growing 
disbalance between participants from the 
EU and Eastern European countries. While 
the difference is not so visible on the annual 
assembly (since it is easier to finance one trip 
a year), it is visible on the more regular work 
of thematic groups. This way, EaP CSF is 
becoming increasingly the Eastern European 
CSOs forum, instead of being a joint venture 
of the EU and EaP CSOs. The latter raises the 
question about how the EaP CSF could serve its 
original mission to facilitate exchange of best 
practices and knowledge between CSOs from 
the EU and the partner countries.  
We do not argue for additional funding, but, 
the EU should consider prioritization of activities 
related to CSF in its instruments such as ENPI 
or EIDHR. EuropeAid regularly announces calls 
worth hundreds of thousands of euros to support 
networking between EU policymakers and 
citizens of EU partner countries. Our advice 
is that priority allocation of funds already 
earmarked for the neighborhood should go to 
the support of the EaP CSF, especially its thematic 
working groups and national platforms. Thus, 
there is no need for much more money, just for 
careful targeting of money which has already 
been pledged for the neighborhood. Let us 
reiterate that even though ad hoc workshops 
have their merit, once experience showed that 
institutionalized dialogue is a must, then this 
new policy has to be supported by resources. 
iii) policy impact of working groups
What is it that the Civil Society Forum is 
producing that is so valuable that it should 
receive support? A simple answer is that on 
the multilateral level, the CSF should feed the 
EU and partner country policy-makers with 
opinions on the conduct of official diplomatic 
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countries in 2010 and early 2011.25 With 
exception of Armenia, where CSOs failed 
to retain the existence of a united common 
platform, the national platforms in the other five 
partner countries have became a central point 
for CSOs active in the field of reforms related to 
the agenda of the EaP. However, their capacities 
to make a relevant impact on national policies 
are limited since most of the governments of 
EaP countries do not yet treat them as partners 
qualified for a regular dialogue. The situation 
has been changing recently in Moldova and 
Ukraine, where talks between representatives 
of the governments and EaP CSF national 
platforms on issues related to EaP agendas 
have begun,  thanks to EU diplomacy. The 
crucial reforms in the end can be implemented 
on a national level. 
However, the national platforms not only need 
to strengthen their unity, but also to make an 
impact on policy. For this, there are two parallel 
initiatives undergoing currently in Ukraine and 
Moldova within a project called “National 
Convention on EU”.26 This is a clear positive 
contribution of the EU in the East and a similar 
trajectory should be adopted also in the South. 
National platforms should give a priority to 
topical bilateral agendas of the partnership 
between their countries and the EU. In Eastern 
Europe, the partner countries differ from each 
other significantly, including the level of their 
bilateral engagement with EU. Ukraine finds 
itself at the end of its talks on an Association 
Agreement, while Moldova and Georgia 
are just launching their talks on Association 
Agreements. 
Moreover, the EaP countries economies 
25	 Azerbaijan	in	April	2010,	followed	by	CSOs	in	
Armenia	in	June	2010,	Belarus	in	July	2010,	Georgia	in	
November	2010,	Ukraine	in	January	2011,	and	Moldova	in	
March	2011.
26	 The	project	is	implemented	by	the	RC	SFPA	in	
cooperation	with	partners	in	Moldova	and	Ukraine	and	
financed	by	SlovakAid.	It	strengthens	the		institutional	
capacities	for	the	process	of	harmonization	of	EU	norms	
and	legislation,	which	Ukraine	and	Moldova	agreed	to	
meet	within	the	Eastern	Partnership	(EaP)	framework.	.	
Within	National	Conventions,	thematic	working	groups	
were	established	following	specific	priorities	of	a	given	
country	in	its	relations	with	the	EU.		Working	groups	prepare		
recommendations	for	the	governments	on	specific	issues.		
Slovak	experts	participate	in	the	meetings	of	working	groups	
and	share	Slovakia’s	transition	experience	on	concrete	
sectoral	issues.	For	more	info	visit	the	web	page	of	the	
National	Convention	on	EU	in	Moldova	(http://conventia.
md/)	and/or	Ukraine	(http://www.euconvention.org.ua).
relations and cooperation. The aim of the 
four multilateral working groups is to produce 
policy recommendations for the work of official 
EaP platforms, where EU and partner country 
representatives lead a dialogue. Presently, in 
the EaP CSF, each working group is led by two 
coordinators, one of whom is the representative 
of a CSO from a partner country and the 
second one represents a CSO from an EU 
member state. So far the working groups have 
proposed 96 projects aimed at implementing 
EaP priorities.24 
However, due to the negative positions of some 
of the governments of the partner countries, 
the representatives of EaP CSF have been 
denied participation in the official meetings 
of the thematic platforms on the level of senior 
officials. They have even been denied the status 
of observers. This makes the policy impact of 
the EaP working groups limited. One way of 
strengthening the impact would be if the CSF 
was asked to present opinions on all phases of 
the policy cycle. Key EU institutions should also 
invite Forum representatives on a regular basis 
to provide their opinions on the agenda of the 
Eastern Partnership that will be deliberated at 
the EU level. 
In the end, this is exactly the “deeper 
engagement with civil society” the latest EU 
ENP review calls for. There is a stark difference 
between providing NGO’s with funding for 
policy research (something which is happening 
yet without desirable impact), and regularly 
inviting them to comment on  decision-making. 
This is where the Eastern CSF  should be 
headed and this is also something that can be 
recommended to a proposed Mediterranean 
CSF.
iv) policy impact of national platforms
Although the multilateral working groups are 
important to liaison with the EU and to exchange 
information between the representatives of 
individual partner countries, the key instrument 
of the CSF should be the national platforms. 
In EaP, they were created in the six partner 
24	 Delcour,	L.	(2011)	The	Institutional	Functioning	
of	the	Eastern	Paertnership:	An	Early	Assessment.	Estonian	
Centre	of	Eastern	Partnership:	Eastern	Partnership	Review	1,	
October.
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are structurally different and their national 
interests toward the EU vary. While industrial 
production is a vital issue for Ukraine, it is not 
for Moldova. The same thing applies to the 
Mediterranean. While they may share some 
similar interests regarding the EU, Tunisia, Egypt 
and other countries do have different structure 
of economies and in the end different specific 
interests and demands vis a vis the EU. 
The ideal scenario would be that national 
platforms create their own national working/
sectoral groups that would follow the list of priority 
agendas of their countries and/or sectoral 
structure of future Association Agreements. The 
major lesson that we have learned so far from 
the Eastern neighborhood is that the EU-partner 
country relations have to be co-determined by 
the EU, partner government and civil society. 
The experience from Eastern Europe shows 
that joint subcommittees of EU-EaP Country 
Cooperation Committees that are supposed to 
serve as a reporting and feedback mechanism 
within EaP, many times did not serve this goal 
since they did not meet regularly (or in some 
cases not at all in a single year). For an efficient 
neighborhood policy,  regular reporting and 
feedback meetings should be mandatory and a 
control body should be entrusted to oversee this 
process. National platforms should aim at being 
invited to participate and to monitor the work of 
joint EU-partner countries’ subcommittees and 
the work of national authorities in implementing 
priorities of partnership with the EU.
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This policy study was written as part of the project, Democracy, Partnership, Enlargement - Challenges for Europe, Challenges for 
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